Politics Against Law by van den Haag, Ernest
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 82 Issue 4 
1984 
Politics Against Law 
Ernest van den Haag 
Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law and Politics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ernest van den Haag, Politics Against Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 988 (1984). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol82/iss4/44 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
POLITICS AGAINST LAW 
Ernest van den Haag* 
THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE. Edited by .David 
Kairys. New York: Pantheon. 1982. Pp. ix, 321. Cloth, $22.50; pa-
per, $9.95. 
There are many things wrong with our legal system. The losing 
party in a civil suit does not have to pay the expenses of the winning 
party. This encourages litigiousness and makes it inviting for rich 
persons to harass poor ones and for poor persons to, in effect, black-
mail corporations and the rich. Contingent fees contribute to this 
litigiousness and the resulting overload of the courts. The voir dire 
of prospective jurors delays trials and makes them costly with no 
discernible advantage to justice. The exclusionary rule has long 
been demonstrated to have no deterrent value in keeping law en-
forcement officers law abiding and to be of use only to guilty sus-
pects or defendants. I could go on. But in the "Progressive 
Critique" under review matters of this kind are ·not discussed. 
Rather, we find chapters headed "Antonio Gramsci and 'Legal He-
gemony'," "Contract Law as Ideology," and "Perspectives on Wo-
men's Subordination and the Role of Law." The authors are more 
interested in attacking, or dismissing, our legal system for not being 
in accord with their ideological views, for supporting a social order 
which they oppose, than in improving or even criticizing the legal 
system in ways relevant to improvement. Perhaps there is nothing 
wrong with that. Nonetheless the performance is disappointing. 
The authors, with very few exceptions, discuss imaginary problems 
with great passion while ignoring real ones. Thus the whole effort 
seems irrelevant to any politics or to any law, although aimed at 
"The Politics of Law." 
The keynote is struck in David Kairys' Introduction - although, 
to be fair, none of the other authors writes quite as badly. According 
to Mr. Kairys, judges 
form values and prioritize [sic] conflicting considerations based on 
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their experience, socialization, political perspectives, self-perceptions, 
hopes, fears, and a variety of other factors. The results are not, how-
ever, random; their particular backgrounds, socialization, and exper-
iences - in which law schools and the practice of largely commercial 
forms of law play an important role - result in a patterning, a consis-
tency, in the ways they categorize, approach, and resolve social and 
political conflicts. [P. 5]. 
Well, I should hope so. Although Mr. Kairys apparently objects he 
doesn't tell his reasons. Why shouldn't it be one purpose of the judi-
ciary to decide conflicts in a consistent pattern? Would inconsis-
tency be desirable? \Yb.at patterns does Mr. Kairys prefer? There is 
a clincher: "[The law] . . . legitimizes dominant social and power 
relations ... [and] confers a broader legitimacy on a social system 
and ideology that, despite their claims . . . are . . . characterized by 
domination by a very small, mainly corporatized [sic] elite" (p. 5). 
This statement (a complaint, I guess, but we are not told why) sug-
gests the essence of the complaints of all the progressive authors of 
this volume: (1) The social system is bad. We are not told much 
about what makes it bad, except for the suggestion, here and there, 
that some people are poor, others wealthy, some are powerful, others 
are not and, most often, that power and wealth are held by a "small 
. . . elite." (2) Since the law's perceived legitimacy supports and le-
gitimizes advanced capitalism the law as legislated, taught and prac-
ticed is bad too. Stripped of their evaluative content these two 
statements amount to saying that the law legitimizes and supports 
the existing social syi;tem. Now, this is quite true; it is also quite 
trivial. I don't know of anyone silly enough to deny it; how could it 
be otherwise? The law, anywhere, and in any social system is not 
meant to do less than articulate and support the social order. How 
could the law support a social system other than the one in which it 
is legislated and applied? The law in a socialist society cannot "legit-
imize" or support capitalism, nor, in a capitalist society, socialism. 
I feel a little embarrassed to have to explain this to Mr. Kairys 
and his coauthors. Still I must. The law always consists of (1) some 
nearly universal rules (of various· kinds) that are almost part of the 
definition of law, such as ''pacta sun/ servanda," "de minimis non 
curat praetor," or "nu/la poena sine lege ," and (2) specifically legis-
lated statutes, customs, rules and ad hoc decisions which, indeed, ar-
ticulate, legitimize and enforce the prevailing culture and ideology, 
and the existing social order and its rules. To be sure, ideology 
changes and so does the social order; these changes sometimes are 
reflected in the law and sometimes are helped along, or resisted, by 
legislation and by judicial pronouncements. Surely none of this can 
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come as a surprise to Mr. Kairys. Did he expect American law to 
support either Nazism or Communism? Or Communist or Nazi law 
to support democratic capitalism? 
It would have been more interesting to investigate the large areas 
in which there is an overlap among the legal systems of all societies. 
In a socialist as well as a capitalist society the poor are more tempted 
to rob than the rich. In both societies the law tries to protect pro-
spective victims by punishing robbers. Both social systems must deal 
with divorce and child support, with attacks against public authority, 
with murder and with theft. To me the case for the existence of an 
area of study called law, independent of specific political orders, 
seems much better than Mr. Kairys or his authors let on. In any 
society - "progressive," socialist, capitalist, or whatever - there 
must be law which legitimizes the prevailing social order and also 
uses the universal rules mentioned above. Why this should, some-
how, be a grievance against law beats me altogether. I cannot under-
stand why Mr. Kairys writes with an air of discovery "[l]aw is simply 
politics by other means" (p. 17). It cannot be less. It may be more. 
It is the "other means" that are interesting to the lawyer, of course. 
To be sure, legal institutions may enjoy different degrees of inde-
pendence from incumbent power-holders. Accordingly, judges may 
or may not be able to apply impartially the accepted legal rules of a 
society to particular cases. Is it then the complaint of the authors of 
this volume that our legal establishment is less independent of 
power-holders than legal institutions elsewhere, or in the past? It is 
not made clear, but the major complaints seem to be "structural," 
not against abuses but against the legal order as such. At any rate, 
our judiciary seems more independent from the government and 
from any specific power-holder than the judiciary is in Eastern Eu-
rope, or in South or Central America, Africa or Asia. We are not 
told in this volume of any instances of illegitimacy in the sense of 
intervention by nonjudicial power-holders in particular cases. The 
attack is against the legitimate practices of the law. They are de-
picted as, somehow, illegitimate because they support the existing 
society, which is bad, and fail to support something else which is 
nebulously adumbrated, but never described. 
Although the authors do not explain why our society is bad, it 
seems fair to say, nonetheless, that they feel that our society is insuf-
ficiently egalitarian. Indeed, as far as I can make out that seems to 
be their main grievance. (A very un-Marxian one, incidentally, al-
though some, but not all, of the authors are Marxists.) Yet in the 
distribution of power, income, and prestige, and with respect to ac-
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cess to consumption, American society is more egalitarian than any 
socialist society I know of, and more egalitarian than any major cap-
italist society that I am familiar with. The authors seem to compare 
American society not to any other society, past or present, but simply 
to an implicit utopian construct. By definition, all actual societies 
are worse than wishful constructs. 
About this implicit wishful construct the authors, so critical of 
the prevailing social order, do not ask, let alone answer, the most 
obvious questions: How much equality is desirable? How much 
does equality impinge on other desiderata, such as liberty? If it be 
desirable, how much equality is possible? Even with minimal lib-
erty, as for instance in the Soviet Union, or in China, I can see no 
way of avoiding inequality: some people make much more money 
than others and some people gain much more power than others. 
Economic activity requires a management elite, cultural activity a 
cultural elite. Neither need be politically selected, as both currently 
are in socialist societies, and both may be open. But they are elites, 
however selected. The notion of government itself implies that a few 
- the government - at any time hold much more power than 
others - the governed. Further, if people are not rewarded accord-
ing to their ability, skill and effort, they will not apply any of these 
and we will all be poor - though still unequally so since people 
spend at different rates. On the other hand, if effort, skill, and ability 
are to count for anything, inequality cannot be avoided since they 
are unequally distributed. Further, if these factors are not evaluated 
by an impersonal market, which distributes income accordingly, they 
have to be evaluated by a bureaucracy and by politicians. Would 
such a relocation of evaluations really lead to less arbitrary or mor-
ally better evaluations? It certainly would be less efficient than the 
market is. 
Let me now tum to a few instances which seem typical of the 
modus operandi of these "progressive" critics of the law. (Inciden-
tally, in the volume under review, progressive denotes whatever the 
authors approve of. Synonyms used are "radical," "critical," "left," 
and "socialist.") 
In "The History of Mainstream Legal Thought," Professor Eliza-
beth Mensch endorses Robert Hale, who "pointed out . . . [that] 
market exchanges are in fact a function of the legal order . . . so-
called free bargains (and taken collectively the supposedly objective 
market price) are determined by the legally protected right to with-
hold what is owned" (p. 37). This is true, but trivial, if it means that 
market exchanges require a legal order including the legal concept of 
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property. However, that legal framework determines bargains, or 
prices, only in the sense in which the rules of a baseball game deter-
mine the outcome. If the rules really did determine outcomes, re-
gardless of the input of the players, there would be no game. If "the 
legal order'' really did, there would be no "free bargains." Actually 
the rules only determine the kind of game played: baseball, not ten-
nis; capitalism, not central planning. The equivocation between the 
meanings of "function" and "determine" (between (1) limiting and 
regulating transactions and (2) ordaining their outcome) seems too 
silly to appear in a publication meant to be taken seriously. 
Professor Duncan Kennedy ("Legal Education as Training for 
Hierarchy") contends that law schools provide "ideological training 
for willing service in the hierarchies of the corporate welfare state" 
(p. 40). He seems to think that providing this training is wrong, or 
bad, but he does not say why. Any society trains its young to serve 
in and to continue that society. A socialist society provides training 
for ''willing service in the hierarchy" of a socialist society. I find 
nothing wrong with this, but Professor Kennedy does. Nor does it 
occur to him that his own teaching at Harvard Law School (not to 
speak of the behavior of Harvard law students) indicates that the 
practice he objects to, however interpreted, does seem to tolerate ex-
ceptions. He does contend, however, that what he ( or is it only his 
colleagues?) does "teach along with basic skills is wrong, is non-
sense" (p. 40). I won't argue about this. He knows best. But his 
other grievances should be mentioned. 
Professor Kennedy complains about excessive deference for 
teachers, "a passivizing [sic] classroom experience" (p. 43) (I had not 
thought law school graduates to be a passive or deferential bunch), 
and about the law school being "culturally reactionary" (p. 42) since 
it affords "no purchase for left or even for committed liberal think-
ing" (p. 43). The liberal student is left "to undertake the Procrustean 
task of reinterpreting every judicial action as the expression of class 
interest" (p. 49). I agree that this would be a Procrustean task. Does 
Professor Kennedy? He believes that law is "an aspect of class strug-
gle" (p. 50). If so, the task wouldn't be Procrustean. Did he confuse, 
as the context seems to indicate, Procrustes with Sisyphus? Anyway, 
Procrustean would seem an apt characterization of his essay. My 
task in reviewing it is Sisyphean. 
Some of Professor Kennedy's complaints seem based on an alto-
gether remarkable failure to understand what teaching any subject is 
all about. He feels aggrieved because "[grades are experienced as] 
unrelated to how much you worked, how much you liked the sub-
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ject, how much you thought you understood going into the exam, 
and what you thought about the class and the teacher'' (p. 50). Well, 
I should hope so. Shouldn't grades reflect demonstrated knowledge 
rather than what you thought about the class and the teacher, how 
much you thought you understood, how much you worked? 
Shouldn't students perceive as much? Professor Kennedy doesn't 
seem to think so. I hope that his practice is better than his theory. 
If you think Professor Kennedy interesting, then Professor Rich-
ard Abel ("Torts") is downright intriguing. He seems to be a Marx-
ist ( circa 1930) of a kind I (wrongly) believed extinct. Here is a 
sampler: "In precapitalist society, injury . . . elicits care from inti-
mates ... motivated by concern" (p. 187) whereas, under capital-
ism, compensation is elicited. Abel's history seems shaky here, but 
worse is to come: "[T]he medical profession disables victims and 
intimates from caring for illness and injury . . . . to protect . . . the 
monopoly of expertise of the ... physician" (p. 188). How are vic-
tims and intimates disabled from "caring for illness and injury"? 
Does consulting physicians or being operated on in a hospital really 
"disable" anyone else from caring? At any rate, isn't it a helpful 
alternative? Or should your friends and relatives do the surgery and 
prescribe the medicines? Did medicine men, or precapitalist physi-
cians, do better? Did they help their patients more and did they, un-
like today's physicians and lawyers, share their expertise? Clio must 
be weeping. 
All these nasty capitalist things are done because "capitalists 
have to maximize profits ... they must[Abel's italics] sacrifice the 
health and safety of others ... " (p. 188). Yet tort law may be effec-
tive. If so, I was naively tempted to think, it makes the preservation 
of other people's health, and protection from injury, part of maxi-
mizing profits. But that makes tort law worse according to Professor 
Abel: "By compensating owners for property damage it upholds the 
notion of private property" (we are not told why that notion is bad) 
and still worse "[b ]y preserving the income streams of those who suf-
fer physical injury . . . tort law affirms the legitimacy of the existing 
income distribution" (p. 194). Very nasty of tort law to do that. 
Would it be better not to compensate an injured person? Apparently 
tort law should be used for income redistribution independent of 
torts suffered. But tort law could do so only by ceasing to be tort 
law. Professor Abel does not tell us just why tort law is the right 
instrument for redistribution, nor how it should be used. 
Tort law is even nastier than anyone dreamt. By giving mone-
tary damages for suffering it simulates "a market in sadomasochism" 
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(p. 195). I have given serious thought to Professor Abel's "market 
for sadomasochism" but it leaves me confounded. I haven't been 
able to figure out what he means. Sadists enjoy hurting people. 
Masochists enjoy being hurt. However I know of no evidence indi-
cating that persons whose behavior results in a tort suffered by 
others, enjoy the injury for which they are liable (sadism), or that 
those who suffer it enjoy their suffering (masochism) or that either 
enjoys asking for, or giving the compensation tort law grants. Nor 
do I know of persons enjoying the spectacle. Thus this "market" 
leaves me confounded. Wherein does the sadomasochism lie? Pro-
fessor Abel does not tell. Nor does he bother to suggest evidence. I 
suspect that his "market for sadomasochism" has no meaning other 
than disapproval ( of the tort remedy?) expressed in dramatic terms 
without precise meaning; indeed without any applicable meaning. 
Professor Abel is less original, though more intelligible when he 
says "[d]amages commodify [sic] our unique experience by substitut-
ing the universal equivalent, money" (p. 195). This echoes Marx's 
well-known "fetishism of commodities. Tort law does compensate 
for a uniquely unpleasant experience through money. The author 
does not indicate how else to compensate for a lost limb. Nor does 
Professor Abel mention that, since time immemorial, money even 
compensated for lost life. It is the best that can be done by social 
regulation. Love undoubtedly would be better but cannot be pro-
duced by fiat. Just how tort law could exist without monetary dam-
age payments is not explained, but, then, perhaps it shouldn't exist 
and Professor Abel is too cagey to tell us. 
Enough of this. Nearly all (but not quite all) the essays in this 
volume are as silly as those I have quoted from. Some are abstruse 
and obscure (e.g., Edward Greer on "Antonio Gramsci and 'Legal 
Hegemony' "). A few are mediocre summaries or quasi-analyses of 
legal cases. One, however, comes perilously near reasonableness, at 
least in comparative terms. Victor Rabinowitz ("The Radical Tradi-
tion in Law") persuasively defends the usefulness oflaw against "the 
IWW-Marcuse-Lefcourt position" (p. 312). But on the whole the 
merit of these writings does not warrant the effort required to read 
them. 
I may be permitted a small digression. Victor Rabinowitz quotes 
(p. 312) as "a fair approximation of a view held by many Marxists," 
Florynce Kennedy, "a prominent militant lawyer" who writes: " ... 
the legal profession, is a whorehouse . . . . The lawyer . . . is analo-
gous to a prostitute. The difference . . . is simple. The prostitute is 
honest - the buck is her aim. The lawyer is dishonest - he claims 
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that justice, service to mankind, is his primary purpose."1 Now, I 
think, that claim is made primarily by "militant" or "progressive" 
lawyers. Other lawyers are quite content to say that they render le-
gal services for a living, just as farmers farm for a living. Still they 
provide a "service to mankind' by providing food, just as lawyers 
provide a service to mankind by helping in the regulation of social 
life. At any rate, I don't understand how Ms. Kennedy learned 
about the motives, honest or dishonest, of either lawyers or prosti-
tutes. Perhaps some prostitutes feel that besides making a living they 
render as socially important a service as do lawyers. But let that go. 
Mr. Rabinowitz does not endorse Ms. Kennedy's view. Yet, in 
an excess of charity, he fails to remark on her odd logic. According 
to her, lawyers "are analogous" to prostitutes because they sell their 
services to those willing and able to pay for them, indeed (horrors) to 
"those best able to afford" them.2 Well, don't physicians? Is the 
medical profession a whorehouse, too, then? Are doctors also 
"analogous to prostitutes"? Taxi drivers, too, sell their services. Not 
only lawyers and doctors do so, but also cooks and coal miners, in-
deed, nearly anyone who does not have an income from capital. (Or 
do coal miners refuse to sell their services to the highest bidder be-
cause of their proletarian virtue? If so, I have not noticed.) Are coal 
miners prostitutes then, or prostitutes coal miners, or both something 
"analogous"? Ms. Kennedy simply discovered that where there is 
gainful employment, as distinguished from slavery, people sell their 
services, or their time, and are paid by other people according to the 
market value of their services. 
A prostitute has that much in common with lawyers and doctors: 
they all sell their services for the highest prices they can get - al-
though any of them may occasionally render services pro bono pub-
lico. Ms. Kennedy's discovery is quite correct. And quite silly. 
Prostitutes differ from taxi drivers, coal miners, or lawyers and all 
these differ from one another, for, although they all sell their serv-
ices, they each sell a different kind of service.3 What makes a prosti-
1. Kennedy, The Whorehouse Theory of Law, in LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE 81 (R. Lef-
court ed. 1971). 
2. Id 
3. Prostitutes are disapproved of because it is felt that the sexual services they sell should 
not be impersonally marketed. Sexual relations should be available only as part of_personal 
relationships such as love or marriage. Some people feel that lawyers rent out their con-
sciences as prostitutes do their bodies. An excessively adversarial system may indeed permit or 
even prompt such violations of ethics. Yet, the task of lawyers - to present the best possible 
case for their clients so as to enable courts to make decisions in the light of all pertinent facts 
and interpretations - is not only compatible with ethical behavior but required by it. Socie-
ties - socialist or capitalist - have always regarded this task as essential and morally required 
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tute a prostitute is not that she sells, but that she sells sexual services. 
What makes a lawyer a lawyer is not that he, or she, sells, but that 
he, or she, sells legal services. I am sure that Mr. Rabinowitz was too 
embarrassed to tell Florynce Kennedy these facts of life, but I think 
she is old enough to know. From now on she need not worry when 
she gets a fee. It does not make her a prostitute, if it is a fee for legal 
services. 
while they have disapproved of the activities of prostitutes. The analogy between the lawyer 
selling his conscience as the prostitute does her body fails because the lawyer need not sell his 
conscience to be a lawyer whereas the prostitute needs to sell or rent her body to be a 
prostitute. 
